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COLORADO SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
(Ewr'oRt's NoTE.-It is intended in each issue of DICTA to print brief abstracts of
the decisions of the Supreme Court. These abstracts will be-printed only after the
time within which a petition for rehearing may be filed has elapsed without such action being taken, or in the event that a petition for rehearing has been filed the abstract
will be printed only after the petition has been disposed of.)

APPEAL AND ERROR-SCIRE FACIAS-No. 12329-Reno vs.

Swadley-Decided September 23, 1929.
Facts.-Judgment below for defendants in error was
rendered March 14, 1928. On March 12, 1928, Reno lodged
the case in the Supreme Court on error and a scire facias was
issued, returnable in twenty days. It was not served on the
defendants in error and no return of service has been made.
On May 4, 1929, counsel for defendants in error receipted for
four copies of the abstract of record, and on June 5, 1929 for
six copies of the brief of plaintiff in error, Reno. Reno now
contends that these receipts constituted a general appearance
of defendants in error.
Held.-Reno's contention is unsound. If a scire facias
or summons to hear errors cannot be served on defendants in
error as required by the Rules of the Supreme Court, the plaintiff in error should either apply to the Court for relief or obtain consent of the defendant in error for an extension.
Writ Dismissed.
ASSIGNMENT OF LEASE IN GOVERNMENT PERMIT-NO. 12155

-Ratcliff vs. Miller-Decided June 17, 1929.
Facts.-Plaintiffsold to the defendant certain cattle and
farm equipment, and assigned the right to use certain cattle
brands. Also, sold and assigned certain cattle grazing privileges on a forest reserve, and leased for a term of years certain
ranches. The defendant sold the cattle, and declared that
they would permit the cattle grazing privileges to lapse.
Whereupon the plaintiffs bring this suit asking that the defendants keep the grazing privileges in force.
Held-Under the rules of the Secretary of Agriculture
a grazing privilege is not a property right, and is not appurtenant to the land, and that therefore there was no obligation
to keep the privileges in force.

DICTA
CHANGE OF COUNTY SEAT-STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION-No.

12,330-People vs. County Commissioners of Chaffee
County-Decided September 16, 1929.
Facts-Suit was brought to prevent the changing of the
county seat of Chaffee County from Buena Vista to Salida.
The contest depends upon the question of registration of electors in eight precincts in Salida. Section 2, Article 14, of the
state constitution makes certain limitations for the removal of
county seats and provides for legislative action on this subject.
In 1881 the legislature passed an act under this provision, relating to change of county seats. It was contended that this
statute was at least impliedly repealed by the 1917 act concerning elections generally, in which the procedure, officials
and qualifications of electors are different from the act of
1881; that this election was attempted to be held under the
1881 act; and that the alleged registration of voters under this
act was no registration at all.
Held.-The 1881 act was passed under a direction of the
constitution on the special question of removal of county seats.
The 1917 act is general in its terms, and does not either expressly or impliedly repeal the 1881 act. Therefore, the election here questioned was properly conducted.
Judgment Affirmed.
CHATTEL MORTGAGE

-

COMPROMISE -

NEWLY

DISCOVERED

12,406-Staley and Startzell, co-partners,
etc. vs. Nazarenus-Decided October 7, 1929.
Facts.-One Hoops sold an automobile to Nazarenus,
who gave back a mortgage which was transferred to the plaintiffs, doing business as the Guaranty Finance Company. Nazarenus then returned the automobile to Hoops and alleges that
the Finance Company participated in the settlement, took a
new mortgage from the new owner of the car, agreed to return
Nazarenus' note, and that these things were done in compromise of a disputed claim. The company retained the note and
brought this action upon it. Nazarenus filed a cross complaint
for damages for the failure to return his note and had judgment. The company then filed a motion for a new trial,
alleging that they had discovered new evidence, but the motion was denied.
EVIDENCE-No.

DICTA

Held.-This was a settlement of a disputed claim and
evidence concerning it was properly admitted. The motion
for new trial was properly denied, because there was no showing of plaintiff's diligence or excusable error.
Judgment Affirmed.
MORTGAGES--REPLEVIN-NO. 12352-Brown vs.
Driverless Car Co.-Decided June 24, 1929.
Facts.-Plaintiffheld a chattel mortgage upon a certain
automobile, executed by one Thomas. Thomas transferred
the title to the automobile to the Hopper Motor Company,
free of liens. The evidence showed that plaintiff knew of the
transfer and consented thereto. Hopper Motor Company
transferred the title to the defendant, free of liens. The chattel
mortgage not having been paid the plaintiff brings a Replevin
action.
Held.-That Replevin is the proper remedy to recover
possession of mortgaged property, but in the instant case the
mortgagee having expressly consented to the sale by the
mortgagor, the mortgage is void as to third parties.
CHATrEL

DECLARATORY JUDGMENT-UNCONSTITUTIONAL ORDINANCE
-PUBLIC
POLICY-PARI DELICTO--No. 12,163-Menzel

vs. Niles Company-Decided October 7, 1929.
Facts.-One Bates owned two groups of lots-one group
facing west on Steele Street, the other facing east. An ordinance provided that no apartment house for more than four
families should be erected unless a majority of the property
owners on both sides of the street consented. Bates desired to
build such an apartment house on the lots facing west and the
property owners in the block consented after Bates had agreed
to provide suitable parking and trees around the apartment
house *(and had also agreed that only dwelling houses of a
certain type should be erected on the opposite lots.) Niles
Company, by mesne conveyances, became the owner of the
lots facing east and brought this action to determine the
validity of the agreement between Bates and the property
owners. Prior to the beginning of this suit, the ordinance re*The facts in brackets were furnished by Mr. Barnwell S. Stuart, of counsel
for defendant in error, and do not appear in the opinion of the Court.

DICTA

quiring the property-owners' consent was declared unconstitutional.
Held.-Although in form under the declaratory judgments act, the case is essentially one to quiet title against any
claims under Bates' agreement with the property owners. The
ordinance having been found unconstitutional, there was no
consideration for the agreement, which is moreover, contrary
to public policy. Even if the parties are in pari delicto, the
public interest requires that relief be granted Niles Company,
and the title to the lots in question is therefore quieted in the
company.

Judgment Affirmed.
USURPATION - RIGHT TO SALARY - No.
12132-Grahamvs. Lindsey-Decided September 16, 1929.
Facts.-In an action under the code usurpation act, the
Denver District Court held that Lindsey was entitled to the
office of Juvenile Judge in Denver. The Supreme Court reversed this decision, and the District Court then found that
there had been frauds in the election for the disputed office,
that Lindsey was not elected, and that Royal R. Graham was
elected. During the case's pendency in the Supreme Court,
Royal R. Graham died and his widow and administratrix of
his estate was substituted as relator; thereafter she brought this
action to recover from Lindsey the salary from the beginning
of the January term after the election to Royal R. Graham's
death. Lindsey defends on four grounds: (1) That Graham's
title to the disputed office had never been established; (2) that
the right to have this title ascertained abated with Graham's
death; (3) That Graham could not have been inducted into
the office by virtue of the Supreme Court's writ of quo warranto; and (4) that Graham was not qualified under the law
to hold the office.
Held.-(1) Graham's title to the office is res judicata
under the second decision of the District Court in this case;
(2) the right to hold the office, but not the right to an adjudication of the right ceased at Graham's death; (3) there is no
merit in defendant's third and fourth contentions.
Judgment Reversed and Cause Remanded.
JUVENILE JUDGE -

DICTA

INJ URIES-AUTOMOBILES---EVIDENCE-No. 12071
Schneider vs. Ingalsbe-Decided September 23, 1929.
Facts.-Ingalsbe started to walk across Interocean Avenue, in the town of Holyoke, about six o'clock on a November
evening. She saw Schneider's car coming from her right at a
distance of about 400 feet, and also another car coming from
her left. She did not know how fast Schneider's car was coming, but knew that a town ordinance limited speed on this
street to ten miles per hour. The evidence indicated that
Schneider was driving about 40 miles an hour. He alleges
that Ingalsbe was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law in not continuing to look in his direction after she
first saw him approaching.
Held.-Ingalsbe had a right to assume that Schneider
was driving at a legal rate of speed; that he would use ordinary
care in approaching the cross-walk which she was using; and
that if he did so she would reach the opposite side of the street
safely.
Judgment Affirmed.
PERSONAL

ORDER-No. 12383-Martin vs. WayDecided July 1, 1929.
Facts.-An action was brought to enjoin the Treasurer
of San Juan County from issuing a treasurer's deed to certain
property. The defendant filed a general demurrer which was
overruled, and a temporary injunction issued. The defendant
stood on his demurrer and brings the case to the Supreme
Court upon application for supersedeas.
Held.-It was incumbent upon the defendant to have
final judgment entered before taking the case to the Supreme
Court, as no writ of error will lie unless there is a final judgment, and a temporary injunction is not a final order.
PRACTICE-FINAL

RIGHTS-INJUNCTION-No. 12127-Handy Ditch
Co. vs. Greeley & Loveland Irrigation Co.-Decided June
17, 1929.
Facts.-An action was brought by the plaintiff to restrain
the defendants from interfering with plaintiff's use of water.
Plaintiff owns the right to use a certain amount of water from
WATER
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the river. They also own five large storage reservoirs, and no
priorities for the storage. They seek to temporarily impound
more water in their reservoirs, and use later in the season on
the claim that the impounding is temporary and that they are
only withdrawing their direct appropriation.
Held.-The plaintiff is entitled to its direct appropriation, but having no appropriation for reservoir purposes it
cannot claim any storage rights, as the storage of water would
interfere with the rights of other appropriators.

WILLS -

CONSTRUCTION -

DISCRETION OF EXECUTOR-No.

12,416-Stuart vs. U. S. National Bank-Decided September 16, 1929.
Facts.-This is an action for judicial construction of a
will. Plaintiff and testator Stuart were married in 1873. They
had three children, and were divorced in 1899. In 1923 testator executed his will providing that his executors should purchase for plaintiff a life maintenance in some reliable Old
Ladies' Home, in the selection of which and in the determination of the amount to be paid for her relief, the decision of
the executors should be conclusive. This provision was directed to be a first and prior charge on the estate after the payment of debts and expenses. The other beneficiaries are distant relatives of the testator. Plaintiff alleges that her health
will not permit her to live in an Old Ladies' Home and asks
that she be supported outside of such a home. She has not made
the other beneficiaries parties to this suit, and the executor's
demurrer for defect of parties was sustained in both the
County and District Courts.
Held.-The will makes this provision for plaintiff a prior
charge on his estate and solely within the discretion of his executors. The other beneficiaries are, therefore, not necessary
parties, and the executor is directed it may provide for plaintiff outside of an Old Ladies' Home and that it can be called
to account only for a clear abuse of the discretion vested in it.
Judgment Reversed.

DICTA
PRACTICE - No. 12335-Ontario Mining Company vs. Industrial Commission-Decided June 17, 1929.
Facts.-Plaintiff was employed to assist Ebersole who
contracted to construct an "upraise" on defendant's mining
property. Plaintiff was injured in connection with said employment. Plaintiff and Ebersole entered into an agreement
whereby Ebersole was to pay $500 in full settlement of all
claims and did pay $200. Plaintiff later filed a claim with
the Commission. The Commission awarded compensation to
the plaintiff. A rehearing was asked on two grounds. First,
that the commission had no jurisdiction. Second, that the
plaintiff in signing the agreement and accepting $200 had
practiced fraud by filing a claim with the commission. A rehearing was granted and thereafter the commission again made
its award.
Held.-That there was no fraud of which the courts
should take notice, because both parties entered into an agreement which was illegal under the law, which makes settlements between the parties subject to the approval of the commission. This settlement was not submitted to the commission, and the company was waiving its right to raise the question of the failure of the plaintiff to file his claim with the
commission within six months by applying for a rehearing,
which was granted. The defendants submitted to the jurisdiction of the commission.
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Colorado reports to 78, Appeals to 27, Session Laws '79 to '27,
Numerous Statutes, Compiled Laws '21, Digests, etc., Pacific Reporter,
One to 260, Cyc. 40 Vols., Io annuals, Desk book, etc., Modern
American Law, U. S. Compiled Statutes 1918, Supplements of '23
and '25, about 150 standard Text Books, Numerous Quasi-legal

works, 40 Sections Birch Mahogany Mission style Wernicke Book
cases, Office furniture, Terms if desired.
Gaylord St. FRanklin 1561.

William A. Hill.
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